

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.51209/platform.1.11.2025.368-384>  
УДК 111.852(045)

**Ivan SUHAK-SNARSKYI,**

National Academy of Fine Arts and Architecture,  
Kyiv, Ukraine,  
e-mail: [ivan.suhak-snarskyi@naoma.edu.ua](mailto:ivan.suhak-snarskyi@naoma.edu.ua),  
ORCID: 0009-0006-6731-5463

**HERMENEUTIC INTERPRETATION OF ART:  
SHARED AND DIVERGENT VIEWS  
IN THE THOUGHT  
OF M. HIEDEGGER AND H.-G. GADAMER**

**Abstract.** The article explores the contributions of M. Heidegger and H.-G. Gadamer to the foundations of hermeneutic interpretation of art. The purpose of the research is to reveal the commonalities and differences in the philosophical approaches to the interpretation of artworks in the hermeneutic aesthetics of M. Heidegger and H.-G. Gadamer. The methods used in the article include: hermeneutic analysis, comparative and textual analysis, and critical discussion. Heidegger views art as a fundamental means of revealing truth and the world, asserting that it opens up a space where the essence of being is disclosed. For him, works of art are not mere representations, but they actively shape our understanding of existence by bringing hidden truths into the open. Gadamer, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of the interpreter's role in the process of understanding art. He argues that the act of interpretation is always situated within historical and cultural contexts, with the "prejudices" of the interpreter influencing how a work is understood. Unlike Heidegger, who focuses on the event of truth unfolding within art, H.-G. Gadamer sees art as a dialogue between the past and present, where meaning is

negotiated through engagement with the artwork. Both philosophers reject the notion that art is merely about beauty or enjoyment, instead positioning it as a process through which truth is revealed and understood. The study concludes that while both M. Heidegger and H.-G. Gadamer emphasize the ontological dimension of art, their views diverge in terms of the role of the interpreter and the temporality of the art experience. For M. Heidegger, the work of art reveals the truth in a singular, almost event-like occurrence, where the essence of being is disclosed through the artwork itself. The focus is on the “happening” of truth, and the spectator’s role is more passive, as a witness to this disclosure of truth. In contrast, H.-G. Gadamer sees the interpreter as an active participant in the process of understanding, where the act of interpretation is shaped by the historical and cultural, as well as the personal interpreter’s traditions. The meaning of art, for H.-G. Gadamer, unfolds in a continuous dialogue between the artwork and the interpreter, reflecting the temporality of historical consciousness. In this way, the artwork is not a static entity but a dynamic process, where understanding evolves over time through interaction with the work.

**Key words:** hermeneutic interpretation, art, M. Heidegger, H.-G. Gadamer.

**Introduction.** Hermeneutic interpretation of a work of art involves revealing its various levels of meaning by uncovering the artist’s intention, incorporating historical, social, and cultural contexts, as well as the subjective experience of the viewer and their own interpretative “tradition” (in Gadamer's terms). It acknowledges that the meaning of a work of art is not constant, but is recreated each time through the interaction between the artwork, its creator, and the audience.

Philosophers of hermeneutics have played a significant role in changing perceptions of art, shifting the question from

“What is art” to “When does art take place?” Firstly, the focus on art has shifted from the object itself to a broader contextual environment in which the object exists, drawing on a wide hermeneutic context for interpreting artworks. Secondly, the existence of the artwork and its interpreter is considered “in the context of the question of their relation to truth, rather than to the technique of arousing and discharging pre-programmed emotions (catharsis)” [1, p. 39].

**Problem statement.** The new hermeneutic approach to the ontology of art can be seen in opposition to the classical philosophical tradition of understanding. Specifically, this perspective rejects established ideas of the classical approach, such as: the structural similarity between artistic experience and practical knowledge, likening art to technique or a distinctive craft; the view of art as imitation of nature, opposed to reality; and the utilitarian understanding of art as serving the purpose of entertainment. At the same time, philosophical hermeneutics highlights a fundamentally different teleological function of art as a means of attaining truth, which cannot be accessed through scientific research or philosophical and historical inquiry.

The foundational hermeneutic ideas of Heidegger and Gadamer, which have defined the contours of contemporary hermeneutic interpretation of works of art, retain their significance in modern art criticism. This defines the relevance of this article.

**Analysis of recent research and publications.** A significant amount of scholarly research has been dedicated to the problem of hermeneutic interpretation of works of art. When analyzing the theoretical legacy of Gadamer and Heidegger, researchers mainly focus on issues such as the mediation of vision and understanding by the viewer-interpreter, the expansion of the “being” of the artwork, Gadamer's and Heidegger's specific understanding of the hermeneutic circle, which differs from the traditional hermeneutic circle of 19th-

century hermeneutics, the role of tradition and prejudices, the situational nature of interpretation, and other related topics. We will briefly examine these approaches, which form the theoretical foundation of our research.

One of the central ideas in the literature associated with the hermeneutic interpretation of art is that the vision and understanding of a work of art are active, dynamic processes, with the interpreter, the viewer, being the primary condition and component of the interpretative process [4; 15; 16; 21]. In this regard, Gadamer himself emphasizes that the interpreter's own horizon is crucial, "but not as a personal standpoint that he maintains or enforces, but more as an opinion and a possibility that one brings into play and puts at risk, and that helps one truly to make one's own what the artwork says" [7, c. 388-390]. It is the subjective experience of the viewer as an interpreter that has the power to alter the very subject of art, not simply reinterpreting it but expanding its "being" and extending the temporal boundaries of the work's origin. Researchers note that through interpretation, "something is born and grows, something that is reducible neither to the interpreter nor to the text, nor to their combination" [21, p. 251].

In the hermeneutic interpretation of works of art, a key concept for understanding the methodological process remains the notion of the hermeneutic circle, according to which "the interpretation of the meaning of the whole implies understanding the parts, and the understanding of the parts depends on some sense of the whole" [18, p. 112]. Bontekoe connects this with the recognition of how these parts are integrated into the whole: "The object of comprehension, taken as a whole, is understood in terms of its parts, and ... this understanding involves the recognition of how these parts are integrated into the whole" [2, p. 3]. Part of the research on the hermeneutic interpretation of works of art focuses on identifying differences between traditional hermeneutic understanding in 19th-century

hermeneutics – where the circle is “closed” once the understanding of the text is achieved – and the hermeneutic theory of Gadamer and Heidegger [2]. According to these approaches, the circle never fully closes, as it remains dynamic, constantly moving in the tradition synchronized with the movement of the interpreter. Gadamer himself writes that “the understanding of the text remains permanently determined by the anticipatory movement of fore-understanding” [7, p. 293]. If the process of understanding is not continuously supplemented, based on the ongoing flow of new information, the hermeneutic circle may turn into a vicious circle.

Contemporary literature on the hermeneutic interpretation of works of art also focuses on the situational nature of interpretation and the uniqueness of the subjective viewpoint [9; 16; 19], which also traces back to Gadamer’s hermeneutic aesthetics in the context of situational understanding within a specific historical tradition and the role of so-called Gadamerian prejudices. Relying on the philosopher, Green notes that “once we accept the notion of a point of view, we begin to realize that no one has a complete vision from any point in the world” [9, p. 18]. Works of art are viewed through their localization in a historical and cultural context and the experience of a specific interpreter.

Despite the considerable interest researchers have shown in the hermeneutic legacy of Gadamer and Heidegger, the problem of the ontology of art remains insufficiently explored, particularly in the comparison of the hermeneutic aesthetics of these two philosophers, with an emphasis on both the commonalities and differences in their approaches to the hermeneutic interpretation of artworks.

**The aim** of this article is to reveal the commonalities and differences in the approaches to the hermeneutic interpretation of works of art by Heidegger and Gadamer. The methods used in writing the article include: Hermeneutic Analysis, aimed at

interpreting philosophical texts to understand how both thinkers approach the concept of art, truth, and interpretation; Comparative Analysis to juxtapose the philosophical approaches of Heidegger and Gadamer, identifying both commonalities and differences in their views on hermeneutic interpretation; Textual Analysis, with close reading and analysis of primary sources, such as Heidegger's *Being and Time* and Gadamer's *Truth and Method* to draw out their arguments and positions regarding art and interpretation.

**Presentation of the main research material.** The rethinking of the ontology of art in contemporary hermeneutic philosophy is closely associated with the works of late Heidegger, and Gadamer [5; 11]. Let us consider the contributions of Gadamer and Heidegger to the philosophical-hermeneutic approach to the ontology of art, identifying the commonalities and differences in their ideas.

Heidegger, in his works on the ontology and phenomenology of art (Heidegger,), calls for moving beyond aesthetics to understand the true meaning of art and its impact on us. For Heidegger, the essence of art lies in the fact that it becomes a representation that presupposes a level of existence that cannot be fully explained, as knowledge remains partial, what is known remains approximate, and what is mastered remains unstable [12, p. 39]. This interpretation of art resonates with Gadamer's ideas. The hermeneutic circle, according to Gadamer, describes a constant and ongoing process of trial and error, where one always strives to develop correct anticipations, which must be "confirmed by the things themselves" [7, p. 267]. Gadamer argues that the object of understanding is indefinite and renewed with each act of understanding. We can never have a completely objective understanding of a work of art because we cannot overcome the historical specificity and limitations of our preconceptions. The only requirement for interpretation, according to Gadamer, is openness to the thought of the work

and its mutability [7, p. 268]. Behind every effort of understanding operates an “effective history,” the influence of which the interpreter never fully realizes.

The thoughts of the two philosophers resonate in their view that a work of art represents the “unconcealment of truth” [13, p. 262] and that “art is the becoming and the event of truth” [12, p. 59]. This process involves the interpreter in a new way of being in the world [23, pp. 125-140], as the “unfolding” of the work presupposes the creation of a world into which the interpreter can enter, unveiling an environment previously hidden from the surrounding context.

For Gadamer, this new worldview revealed through the interpretation of a work of art is understood through the concept of the “fusion of horizons.” According to Gadamer, attaining a horizon means “learning to look beyond what is immediately at hand – not to divert attention from it but to see it better, in greater totality and more truthful proportion” [7, p. 305].

Although both philosophers agree that art is a key means of revealing being and truth, their approaches differ. For Heidegger, art is a way of unveiling the world, where the work of art creates a space for the revelation of truth as “unconcealment” (aletheia), allowing a person to experience being in the world. In Heidegger’s view, the work of art exists as an event that reveals truth, and in which the viewer becomes part of this revelation. Gadamer, on the other hand, views art as a space for dialogue, where the artwork serves as a medium through which the event of truth occurs. For Gadamer, art is not simply the “unveiling of truth,” but a process of play in which the viewer is engaged in a dialogue, interpreting the work based on their historical horizon of experience. This dialogue not only changes the understanding of the work but also transforms the interpreter, making art a vital element not just in the revelation of truth but also in the transformation of the viewer.

Thus, both Heidegger and Gadamer regard art as a fundamental way of experiencing truth. However, Heidegger focuses on the eventfulness of art as a means of revealing being, while Gadamer emphasizes the dialogical and historical character of the interaction between the interpreter and the artwork.

A central idea in Heidegger's hermeneutic philosophy is the revolutionary potential of art and its ability to focus and transform our sense of what exists and what is meaningful. Great works of art "initially grant things their appearance," meaning they help establish the implicit understanding within a historical community of what things are. At the same time, such works give "humanity its view of itself," shaping the community's implicit conception of what truly matters in life, what deserves preservation in the traditions of the community, and so on [12, pp. 27-29].

Heidegger suggests that art can perform its work of revealing the world on at least three different levels: (a) In the dimension of the micro-paradigm, or "things that act," helping us become aware of what matters most to us in such things; (b) At the level of paradigmatic works of art, such as Van Gogh's paintings and Hölderlin's poetry, which reveal how art itself functions; (c) In the dimension of macro-paradigmatic "great" works of art, such as the Greek temple and tragic drama, which manage to fundamentally transform a historical community's "understanding of being" – its deepest and ultimate realization of what art is and how it reveals being [12, p. 26]. Van Gogh's paintings, in this sense, according to Heidegger, illuminate not only "what art is," helping us move beyond modern aesthetics "from within," but also what it means to encounter being in a "postmodern" way. Thus, for Heidegger, Van Gogh's paintings are both paradigmatic and macro-paradigmatic works.

The difference between the views of the two philosophers, in our opinion, lies in the fact that, unlike

Gadamer, for whom a work of art never loses its relevance, Heidegger believes that an artwork loses such relevance when it is removed from its native sphere and placed into “presentation.” In this context, Heidegger cites the example of the ancient temple and the medieval cathedral, which “no longer gather their historical world around them” and, therefore, no longer function as great art. Such “withdrawal of the world and the world’s disintegration can never be reversed” [12, p. 26]. Everything primordial becomes silenced as something long familiar. All that was won through struggle becomes something merely to be manipulated. Every mystery loses its power [13, pp. 126-127].

Gadamer, in contrast, argues that a work in presentation continues to be interpreted based on its own significance, as interpretation is not something external to the work or art, but rather the medium through which the artwork itself is realized [6, pp. 57-83]. A change in historical understanding across different contexts does not imply a change in the event or essence of the work itself. In the experience of art, we do not merely receive a “moment” of vision but can “dwell” with the work in a way that takes us out of ordinary time into what Gadamer calls “fulfilled” or “autonomous” time.

The philosophical difference between Gadamer and Heidegger can be partly explained by the fact that, for Gadamer, unlike Heidegger, the role of the interpreter is key, involving an “other-involving” [6, pp. 57-83] interaction with the work. The interpreter engages with the work in any context, and thus can interpret it based on that context and their own “tradition.” In this way, art becomes a dialogue that entails a dynamic understanding and development of truth between the interpreter and the artwork. A relationship develops between them in which the interpreter gains the ability to recognize the truth of a work of visual art just as they would when interpreting a verbal text. For Gadamer, the truth in art can be seen as a truth of participation, rather than craftsmanship.

Like Heidegger, Gadamer believes that art contains the potential for understanding truth, but, unlike Heidegger, this realization of truth is always dialogical. Whereas Heidegger emphasizes the “happening” of truth – its occurrence in a work of art – Gadamer’s approach is more “hermeneutic,” as it takes into account the role of the interpreter and emphasizes a historically grounded model of understanding.

There is also a certain difference in Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s understanding of the concept of the hermeneutic circle, although for both philosophers this concept plays a central role in the process of understanding. In his work *Being and Time*, Heidegger argues that the hermeneutic circle is not a closed structure of understanding, but rather ‘an expression of the fore-structure of our existence’ [13, p. 153]. A person always understands through preconceptions based on their experience. However, according to Heidegger, it is important to be aware of these preconceptions and discard false ones, which may come from uncritically accepted tradition. For Heidegger, the key task is not to exit the hermeneutic circle, but to “enter” it properly by recognizing the structure of these preconceptions.

Gadamer agrees with Heidegger that it is necessary to “enter” the hermeneutic circle in the right way. However, unlike Heidegger, Gadamer emphasizes that the “prejudiced” nature of our understanding is what makes understanding possible. For Gadamer, the hermeneutic circle is rooted in historical expectations and preconceptions formed through tradition [7, p. 12]. He believes that there is no understanding without prejudice and that these prejudices are tested over time and by effective history [7, p. 298]. Thus, while both philosophers recognize the importance of properly entering the hermeneutic circle, Gadamer emphasizes the dialogical nature of understanding and the constant presence of prejudice as a constructive element.

**Conclusions.** Both philosophers agree that art plays a fundamental role in the disclosure of truth. For Heidegger, art reveals truth through the event of unconcealment, in which the viewer participates in the unveiling of being. Gadamer, however, views art as a dialogical process where truth emerges through the interaction between the artwork and the interpreter, mediated by history and tradition. A key difference between Heidegger and Gadamer regarding the concept of the hermeneutic circle is that Heidegger emphasizes that understanding emerges from preconceptions that must be consciously re-examined, while Gadamer argues that prejudice is a necessary and constructive component of understanding, rooted in tradition and historical context.

Heidegger treats the viewer as a participant in the event of truth's disclosure, whereas Gadamer emphasizes the active role of the viewer in interpreting and dialoguing with the artwork, suggesting a dynamic relationship that reshapes both the work and the interpreter over time. The article underscores Gadamer's focus on the role of historical and cultural contexts in shaping interpretation, with the positioning of art not as a static entity but as something continually reinterpreted through the lens of history and tradition.

The research offers potential for interdisciplinary exploration between philosophy, history, art, and psychology, allowing scholars to examine the intersection of historical understanding, personal bias, and the active interpretation of artistic objects. In addition, the insights into how art reveals truth through the interplay between the artwork and the viewer can inform art criticism and exhibition curation, emphasizing the need to present artworks in ways that encourage dynamic, historically informed dialogues with viewers.

**References:**

1. Bohachov, A. (2021). *Ontolohiia rozuminnia (filosofska hermenevtyka)*. [Ontology of Understanding (Philosophical Hermeneutics)]. *Pidruchnyk dlia studentiv filosofskoho fakultetu*. Kyiv: KNU [in Ukrainian].
2. Bontekoe, R. (1996). *Dimensions of the hermeneutic circle*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press [in English].
3. Caputo, J. (2000). *More radical hermeneutics: On not knowing who we are*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press [in English].
4. Dallymayr, F. (1989). *Hermeneutics and deconstruction: Gadamer and Derrida in dialogue*. In Diane P. Michelfelder & Richard E. Palmer (Eds.). *Dialogue and deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida encounter*. New York: State University of New York Press, 75-92 [in English].
5. Dreyfus, H. L. (2005). *Heidegger's Ontology of Art*. In H. L. Dreyfus & M. A. Wrathall (Eds.). *A Companion to Heidegger*. Oxford: Blackwell. 392-406 [in English].
6. Gadamer, H.-G. (2006). *The Artwork in Word and Image: "So True, So Full of Being"*. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 23 (1), 57-83 [in English].
7. Gadamer, H.-G. (1989). *Truth and Method*. London: Sheed and Ward [in English].
8. Gadamer, H.-G. (1986). *The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays*. In R. Berlasconi (Ed.). *Cambridge: CUP* [in English].
9. Greene, M. (1995). *What counts as philosophy of education?* In Wendy Kohli (Ed.). *Critical conversations in philosophy of education*. New York: Routledge. 3-23 [in English].
10. Grondin, J. (2016). *The Hermeneutical Circle*. In J. Grondinm N. Keane & C. Lawn (Eds.). *The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics* Oxford, Blackwell. 299-305 [in English].

11. Grondin, J. (2002). *The Philosophy of Gadmer*. K. Plant (trans.). New York: McGill-Queens University Press [in English].
12. Heidegger, M. (1977). *Basic Writings*. In D. F. Krell (Ed.). San Fransisco: Harper [in English].
13. Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and Time*. In J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson (trans.). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd [in English].
14. Heywood, J., Sandywell, B. (1999). *Interpreting Visual Culture. Explorations in the Hermeneutics of Vision*. London: Routledge [in English].
15. Kinsella, E. A. (2006). *Hermeneutics and Critical Hermeneutics: Exploring Possibilities within the Art of Interpretation*. Forum: Qualitative Social Research [On-line Journal], 7 (3).
16. Kögler, H.-H. (2014). *The Idea of Dialogue in Gadamer's Hermeneutics*. *Journal of Dialogue Studies*, 2 (1), 47-67 [in English].
17. Kögler, H.-H. (1996). *The power of dialogue: Critical hermeneutics after Gadamer and Foucault*. In P. Hendrickson (Trans.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press [in English].
18. Schwandt, T. (2001). *Hermeneutic circle*. *Dictionary of qualitative inquiry*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publication. 112-118 [in English].
19. Smith, D. (1999). *Writing the social*. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press [in English].
20. Wachterhauser, B. (1986). *Hermeneutics and modern philosophy*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press [in English].
21. Weinsheimer, J. C. (1985). *Gadamer's hermeneutics: A reading of truth and method*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press [in English].
22. Westphal, M. (1997). *Positive postmodernism as radical hermeneutics*. In R. Martinez (Ed.). *The very idea of radical*

hermeneutics. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press. 48-63 [in English].

23. Wrathall, M. A. (2017). Heidegger's Ontology of Art. In L. Hubert, M. Dreyfus, M. A. Wrathall (Eds.). *Background Practices: Essays on the Understanding of Being* Oxford: Oxford Academic. 125-140 [in English].

**Іван СУГАК-СНАРСЬКИЙ,**

Національна академія образотворчого мистецтва і

архітектури,

Київ, Україна,

e-mail: ivan.suhak-snarskyi@naoma.edu.ua,

ORCID: 0009-0006-6731-5463

**ГЕРМЕНЕВТИЧНА ІНТЕРПРЕТАЦІЯ МИСТЕЦТВА:  
СПІЛЬНЕ ТА ВІДМІННЕ У ПОГЛЯДАХ  
М. ГАЙДЕГГЕРА ТА Х.-Г. ГАДАМЕРА**

**Анотація.** У статті досліджується внесок М. Гайдеггера та Х.-Г. Гадамера в основи герменевтичної інтерпретації мистецтва та його творів. Мета дослідження – виявити спільне та відмінне у герменевтичних підходах до інтерпретації мистецьких творів у творчості двох філософів. У статті використані герменевтичний, порівняльний методи, текстологічний аналіз. М. Гайдеггер розглядає мистецтво як фундаментальний засіб розкриття істини і світу, спосіб розкриття сутності буття. Твори мистецтва усвідомлюються як репрезентації, що формують розуміння самого існування, відкриваючи приховані істини. Х.-Г. Гадамер, з іншого боку, підкреслює важливість ролі інтерпретатора в процесі розуміння мистецтва. Він стверджує, що акт інтерпретації завжди знаходиться в межах історичного та культурного контекстів, а «упередження» інтерпретатора впливають на те, як

розуміється твір. На відміну від М. Гайдегера, який зосереджується на події істини, що розкривається в мистецтві, Х.-Г. Гадамер бачить мистецтво як діалог між минулим і сьогоденням, де значення обговорюється через взаємодію з твором. Обидва філософи відкидають уявлення про те, що мистецтво призначено для краси чи насолоди, натомість позиціонуючи його як процес, за допомогою якого розкривається та розуміється істина. Обидва філософи наголошують на онтологічному вимірі мистецтва, проте їх погляди розходяться у погляді на роль інтерпретатора та тимчасовість художнього досвіду. Для М. Гайдегера відкриття істини твором мистецтва є майже миттєвою подією, де сутність буття розкривається через сам твір мистецтва. У центрі уваги розкривається або «відбувається» істина, а роль глядача більш пасивна, як свідка цього розкриття. На противагу цьому Х.-Г. Гадамер розглядає інтерпретатора як активного учасника процесу розуміння, де акт інтерпретації формується історичними та культурними традиціями, а також особистісним досвідом інтерпретатора. Значення мистецтва, для Х.-Г. Гадамера, розгортається в безперервному діалозі між твором і інтерпретатором, відображаючи тимчасовість історичної свідомості. Таким чином, твір мистецтва є не статичною сутністю, а динамічним процесом, де розуміння розвивається з часом через взаємодію з твором.

**Ключові слова:** герменевтична інтерпретація, мистецтво, М. Гайдегер, Х.-Г. Гадамер.

### **Список використаної літератури:**

1. Богачов А. Онтологія розуміння (філософська герменевтика). Підручник для студентів філософського факультету. Київ: КНУ, 2021. 320 с.
2. Bontekoe R. Dimensions of the hermeneutic circle. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1996. 264 p.

3. Caputo J. More radical hermeneutics: On not knowing who we are. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000. 312 p.
4. Dallymayr F. Hermeneutics and deconstruction: Gadamer and Derrida in dialogue. In Diane P. Michelfelder & Richard E. Palmer (Eds.). Dialogue and deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida encounter New York: State University of New York Press, 1989. Pp.75-92.
5. Dreyfus H. L. Heidegger's Ontology of Art. In H. L. Dreyfus & M. A. Wrathall (Eds.). A Companion to Heidegger Oxford: Blackwell, 2005. Pp. 392-406.
6. Gadamer H.-G. The Artwork in Word and Image: "So True, So Full of Being". Theory, Culture & Society, 2006. Vol. 23. Is. 1. Pp. 57-83.
7. Gadamer H.-G. Truth and Method. London: Sheed and Ward, 1989. 594 p.
8. Gadamer, H-G. The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays. In R. Berlasconi (Ed.). Cambridge: CUP, 1986. 175 p.
9. Greene M. What counts as philosophy of education? In Wendy Kohli (Ed.). Critical conversations in philosophy of education (New York: Routledge, 1995. Pp. 3-23.
10. Grondin J. The Hermeneutical Circle. In J. Grondinm N. Keane & C. Lawn (Eds.). The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics. Oxford, Blackwell, 2016. Pp. 299-305.
11. Grondin J. The Philosophy of Gadamer. In K. Plant (trans.). New York: McGill-Queens University Press, 2002. 192 p.
12. Heidegger M. Basic Writings. In D. F. Krell (Ed.). San Fransisco: Harper, 1977. 397 p.
13. Heidegger M. Being and Time. In J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson (trans.). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1962, 389 p.

14. Heywood J. & Sandywell B. *Interpreting Visual Culture. Explorations in the Hermeneutics of Vision*. London: Routledge, 1999. 278 p.
15. Kinsella E. A. *Hermeneutics and Critical Hermeneutics: Exploring Possibilities within the Art of Interpretation*. *Forum: Qualitative Social Research [On-line Journal]*, 2006. Vol. 7. Is. 3.
16. Kögler H.-H. *The Idea of Dialogue in Gadamer's Hermeneutics*. *Journal of Dialogue Studies*. 2014. Vol. 2. Is. 1. Pp. 47-67.
17. Kögler H.-H. *The power of dialogue: Critical hermeneutics after Gadamer and Foucault*. In P. Hendrickson (Trans.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996. 336 p.
18. Schwandt T. *Hermeneutic circle*. *Dictionary of qualitative inquiry*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publication, 2001. Pp. 112-118.
19. Smith D. *Writing the social*. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1999. 307 p.
20. Wachterhauser B. *Hermeneutics and modern philosophy*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1986. 506 p.
21. Weinsheimer J. C. *Gadamer's hermeneutics: A reading of truth and method*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985. 278 p.
22. Westphal M. *Positive postmodernism as radical hermeneutics*. In R. Martinez (Ed.). *The very idea of radical hermeneutics*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1997. Pp.48-63.
23. Wrathall M. A. *Heidegger's Ontology of Art*. In L. Hubert, M. Dreyfus & M. A. Wrathall (Eds.). *Background Practices: Essays on the Understanding of Being*. Oxford: Oxford Academic, 2017. Pp. 125-140)